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OPINION ANNOUNCING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents a recurring problem concerning the 
amount of fees due counsel under a fee-shifting statute. 
The case also presents the grim reality feared by the 
Supreme Court of the United States when it warned that a 
"request for attorney's fees should not result in a second 
major litigation." Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 
(1983). More specifically, we are presented with a challenge 
to the adequacy of a supplemental award of attorney fees 
and expenses for work performed in post-judgment fee 
litigation in a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated by the 
United States in 1991 in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania. After securing the court-ordered 
release of property seized by the United States Government 
because it was thought to be involved in illegal money 
laundering activities, appellants sought attorney fees and 
expenses incurred in seeking the property's release 
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 
U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(A). In its fourth published opinion in 
this case, the district court awarded the appellant 
$142,643.26 in attorney fees and $7963.51 in expenses 
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covering services through September 26, 1996. See United 
States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
[hereinafter Eleven Vehicles IV]. 1 Subsequently, the 
appellants filed a supplemental request for $23,333.81 in 
attorney fees and $560 in expenses incurred after 
September 26, 1996 in litigating their entitlement to fees 
and expenses for the underlying forfeiture litigation. The 
court awarded the appellants $5000 in attorney fees plus 
$560 in expenses. Disappointed, the appellants, Robert 




In October 1991, the Government filed a complaint for 
forfeiture of the assets of numerous parties, including 
Appellants Robert Clyde Ivy and Irene Ivy ("the Ivys"). Over 
the next four-and-a-half-years, the trial court ordered the 
piece-by-piece release of all the Ivys' seized properties 
pursuant to partial grants of summary judgment in October 
1993 and September 1995, and a final dismissal of the 
Government's forfeiture complaint, with prejudice, in March 
1996.2 In dismissing the case, the district court expressly 
retained jurisdiction for the purpose of considering the Ivys' 
request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the 
EAJA, and the Government's motion for a "certificate of 
reasonable cause" under 28 U.S.C. S 2465. The certificate of 
reasonable cause, if granted, would have protected the 
individuals who actually seized the property at issue from 
liability to the property owners, and would prevent the 
claimants from recovering costs from the Government, 
though not fees or expenses. 
 
On August 30, 1996, the district court granted the 
requested certificate of reasonable cause. It held, however, 
that the Ivys were entitled to attorney fees at a rate of 
$112.28 per hour and to expenses. Eleven Vehicles III, 937 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had previously found that the appellants were 
entitled to attorney fees and expenses under the EAJA. See Eleven 
Vehicles III, 937 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
2. The district court had jurisdiction over this forfeiture action 
pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. SS 1345 and 1355, and 18 U.S.C.SS 981(a)(1)(A), 
981(a)(1)(C), and 981(f). 
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F. Supp. at 1149-56. In ruling on the Ivys' entitlement to 
fees and expenses, the court found that the Ivys were a 
"prevailing party" in the litigation, the Government's 
litigating position had not been "substantially justified," 
and no "special circumstances" existed that would render 
an attorney fee award unjust.3 Id. at 1150-55. The district 
court ordered the Ivys to submit an itemized statement of 
counsel's hours and rates by September 30, 1996. Id. at 
1156. The Ivys submitted the required materials on that 
date. These materials covered work performed on the case 
through September 26, 1996. The Government filed 
objections to some of these requested fees. 
 
The Government filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
award of attorney fees and expenses. The Ivys filed a 
motion for reconsideration of the grant of a certificate of 
reasonable cause and the failure to grant attorney fees at 
market rate. The Ivys also filed a motion requesting the 
court to adjust the hourly billing rate of $112.28, 
established by the court for calculating the amount of 
attorney fees owed to the Ivys, upward to reflect cost of 
living. The parties filed responses to each other's motions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The EAJA provides in pertinent part: 
 
        (A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court 
       shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees 
       and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to 
       subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other 
than 
       cases sounding in tort), ... brought by or against the United 
States 
       in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court 
       finds that the position of the United States was substantially 
       justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 
 
        (B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, 
       within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the 
       court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that 
       the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award 
       under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 
       itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness representing 
       or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time 
expended 
       and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The 
       party shall also allege that the position of the United States was 
not 
       substantially justified. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1). 
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In November 1996, the Ivys apparently gave the 
Government and the court notice that they intended at 
some future date to seek attorney fees and expenses for 
work performed after September 26, 1996. 
 
On May 30, 1997, the district court denied the 
Government's motion for reconsideration as merely a 
"rehash" of earlier arguments in the litigation. As for the 
Ivys' motion for reconsideration of the grant of the 
certificate of reasonable cause and the court's denial of 
their entitlement to attorney fees at market rates, the court 
also, after careful consideration, denied it as essentially a 
restatement of their earlier arguments. Eleven Vehicles IV, 
966 F. Supp. at 363-66. However, the court granted the 
Ivys' request for a cost of living adjustment, revising the 
compensable hourly billing rate upward to $120.68. Id. at 
366-67. Finally, the court accepted one of the Government's 
narrow objections to the fees requested by the Ivys, rejected 
the remainder of the Government's objections, and granted 
attorney fees for 1182 hours of work in the amount of 
$142,643.76, and expenses in the amount of $7,963.81. Id. 
at 367-69. 
 
On August 27, 1997, the Ivys submitted to the district 
court a supplemental request for attorney fees and 
expenses covering work performed after September 26, 
1996. In this application, the Ivys requested $23,333.81 in 
fees as compensation for 190.9 additional hours work, and 
$560.00 in expenses. The Government opposed this 
supplemental request, arguing that the requested 
supplemental payment was not authorized by any law, and 
was in essence a motion under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a) to alter or amend the May 30, 1997 award. 
Because such a request must be filed within 10 days after 
judgment, the Government asserted that the request was 
untimely, and the court's March 30, 1997 award was 
sufficiently generous and adequate to cover additional fees 
and expenses accumulated between September 26, 1996 
and May 30, 1997. Further, the Government argued that 
the Ivys were not entitled to receive fees and expenses for 
post-judgment work, particularly work related to the 
decision not to take an appeal. The Ivys responded to the 
Government's arguments, and in addition asserted that the 
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Government's memorandum in opposition was untimely 
and therefore should not be considered by the district 
court. 
 
After a telephone conference with counsel for the parties, 
the court issued its decision. Eleven Vehicles V, 36 F. Supp. 
2d 237 (E.D. Pa. 1999). The court first held that the Ivys' 
supplemental fee application was not a Rule 59(a) motion, 
but instead arose under the EAJA. Id. at 238 n.1. It then 
addressed the merits of the application, considering the 
supplemental application as a whole along with thefirst 
application and fee award. Id. at 239. The court stated that 
it took into account all of the factors it had considered in 
determining the first fee award. In addition, the district 
court considered that "the supplemental request involves 
work performed on motions for reconsideration of doubtful 
validity filed by both parties," and that "the 190 hours 
spent by counsel appears `excessive, redundant and 
otherwise unnecessary.' " Id. (citation omitted). Based on 
these factors, the court awarded the Ivys an additional 
$5,000 in fees and $560.00 in expenses. The district court's 
opinion did not address the Ivys' argument that the 
Government's opposition to their request was untimely and 




On appeal, the Ivys make several substantive arguments 
in support of their assertion that the district court erred in 
awarding them less attorney fees than they requested. In 
addition, they contend that the court abused its discretion 
by entertaining the Government's late-filed memorandum 
opposing their supplemental request for attorney fees and 
expenses. The Government argues that the supplemental 
fee application is, in essence, a motion to alter or amend 
the district court's May 30, 1997 original fee award under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).4  Accordingly, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In the district court, the Government argued in its opposition to the 
Ivys' supplemental fee application that the application was effectively a 
motion to amend the court's findings of fact under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), 
not 59(e). However, in the instant case, there is little practical effect 
to 
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Government contends that the Ivys were obliged to comply 
with that Rule's requirement that such motions befiled "no 
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(e). Because the Ivys' supplemental fee request 
was filed approximately three months after entry of the May 
30, 1997 award of attorney fees, the Government asserts 
that the request was untimely, and thus the court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court rejected this 
argument, Eleven Vehicles V, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 238 n.1, 
and the Government did not appeal this issue. 
 
It appears well settled that a motion for supplemental 
attorney fees is not a Rule 59(e) motion. In White v. New 
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Security, 455 U.S. 445, 
447-48 (1982) the Court addressed a situation in which the 
petitioner requested attorney fees under the Civil Rights 
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1988, four-and-a- 
half months after winning judgment on the merits. The 
respondent argued that the motion was governed by the 10- 
day time limit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and was therefore 
untimely. The Supreme Court held that Rule 59(e) was 
reserved "only to support reconsideration of matters 
properly encompassed in a decision on the merits." Id. at 
451. The Court concluded that "a request for attorneys fees 
. . . raises legal issues collateral to the main cause of action 
-- issues to which Rule 59(e) was never intended to apply." 
Id. It held that attorney fees are not "compensation" for the 
injury suffered and are not an "element of `relief ' ": 
 
       [A] motion for attorney fees is unlike a motion to alter 
       or amend a judgment. It does not imply a change in 
       the judgment, but merely seeks what is due because of 
       the judgment. It is, therefore, not governed by the 
       provisions of Rule 59(e). 
 
Id. at 452-53 (quoting Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
this discrepancy. Moreover, the court explicitly relied on Brown v. Local 
58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 76 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 1996), 
which considered the same argument under Rule 59(e). The court here 
stated that it saw no difference between relying on subdivision (a) or 
subdivision (e) of Rule 59. Thus, for purposes of our review, this 
discrepancy is immaterial. 
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797 (5th Cir. 1980)). Numerous other decisions of the 
Supreme Court, this court, and other circuit courts have 
made the same observation. See Federal Communications 
Comm'n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 
373 n.10 (1984) ("a postjudgment request for attorney fees 
is not considered a motion to amend or alter the judgment 
under Rule 59(e)").5 
 
The Government asserts that Rule 59(e) nevertheless 
applies in this case because the "judgment" the Ivys sought 
to "alter or amend" with their supplemental fee application 
was the initial May 30, 1997 award of attorney fees. 
However, under White, this May 30 award was not a 
"judgment" at all. See also Cartledge v. Heckler, 615 F. 
Supp. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[U]nder 28 U.S.C. 
S 2412(d)(1)(A), as under other fee-shifting statutes, the fee 
award is really in addition to and not part of the 
judgment."); Watkins v. Harris, 566 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983) ("[t]he EAJA is a fee shifting statute and if 
attorneys' fees are awarded, they are in addition to the 
amount of the judgment"); cf. Schultz v. Crowley, 802 F.2d 
498, 500-05 (D.C. Cir.) (suit is final and not"pending" 
under the EAJA when merits have been decided even 
though post-judgment motion for attorney fees remains 
unresolved), reh'g denied, 806 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 869 (1987). The underlying 
"judgment" in this case was the district court's dismissal of 
the forfeiture proceedings. Because Rule 59(e) only applies 
to motions to alter or amend a judgment, it is inapplicable 
here. 
 
Moreover, even if an initial award of attorney fees is a 
"judgment," a supplemental request for fees and expenses 
incurred during a period of time different from and 
subsequent to the time period covered by an initial fee 
award cannot be a motion under Rule 59(e) because the 
supplemental request does not seek to alter or amend the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Other cases in accord are: Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 75 
F.3d 
564, 567 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1019 (1996); Samuels 
v. American Motor Sales Corp., 969 F.2d 573, 577-78 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Schake, 960 F.2d at 1192; Cruz v. Hauck, 762 F.2d 1230, 1236-37 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
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initial award. Rather, such a request seeks to address only 
fees and expenses not considered in the prior award 
determination. See Brown v. Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, AFL-CIO, 76 F.3d at 769-70. 
 
Thus, the question remains under what authority could 
the district court consider the Ivys' supplemental request 
for attorney fees and expenses.6 The Ivys appear to contend 
that their supplemental request was a valid motion under 
the EAJA. However, the Ivys misconstrue the timing 
requirements of the EAJA. The EAJA requires that a party 
seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall submit 
its application to the court within thirty days of final 
judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(B). The 
underlying "action" here is the Government's forfeiture 
proceeding against the Ivys' property. The "final judgment" 
contemplated by the statute, it seems clear, is the judgment 
dismissing that forfeiture proceeding. It is not, as the Ivys 
argue, the May 30, 1997 adverse ruling on the parties' 
motions to reconsider ancillary matters. That ruling 
involved only post-judgment residual proceedings dealing 
with fees, costs, and expenses.7 
 
There currently is no dispute that the Ivys satisfied the 
EAJA's requirements for their initial claim to attorney fees 
and expenses incurred in the underlying litigation. They 
filed their claim within thirty days after thefinal dismissal 
of the forfeiture case became unappealable. The district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The only other case to address the precise question at issue here was 
Brown v. Local 58, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO. See 76 F.3d at 
769. Although the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Brown 
rejected the appellants objections to the jurisdiction of the district 
court, 
it did not explain on what basis the district court could consider an 
application for supplemental attorney fees. 
 
7. The underlying forfeiture action was dismissed with prejudice and 
"final judgment" entered on March 26, 1996. (See Dist. Ct. Dkt. Entry 
# 146). The concurrence states that the district court's August 30, 1996 
decision in Eleven Vehicles III was thefinal judgment in the underlying 
forfeiture action. However, the court's Eleven Vehicles III decision dealt 
only with post-judgment issues ancillary to the March 1996 dismissal of 
the forfeiture case. As discussed above, these issues had no effect on the 
finality of the March 26, 1996 judgment dismissing the underlying 
forfeiture action. 
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court, in a thoughtful and carefully written opinion, held in 
Eleven Vehicles III that the Ivys were a"prevailing party" in 
the forfeiture litigation, that the Government did not 
substantially justify its litigating position, and that there 
were no "special circumstances" that would make an award 
unjust. The Supreme Court has held that under the EAJA, 
once these findings are made a claimant need not relitigate 
these issues in later claims for attorney fees. See 
Commissioner, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 
496 U.S. 154, 158-62 (1990). Moreover, this court has held 
that once an EAJA fee request has been timely filed, 
"deficiencies in the contents of the claim may be corrected 
if the government cannot show any prejudice arising from 
the later correction of these deficiencies." See Dunn v. 
United States, 775 F.2d 99, 103-04 (3d Cir. 1985); see also 
Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(adopting this circuit's reasoning in Dunn). The Dunn Court 
reasoned that Congress envisioned only one strict 
requirement in EAJA fee cases, namely that the court and 
the Government be put on notice that the claimant seeks 
fees under the EAJA. 775 F.2d at 104. 
 
Thus, once the jurisdictional elements of an initial claim 
for attorney fees under the EAJA have been shown, the 
strictures of the EAJA do not dictate when a request for 
supplemental fees must be filed. In the absence of a 
timeliness requirement imposed by statutory command, a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, or an applicable local court 
rule, "the only time limitation arises out of those equitable 
considerations that a district judge may weigh in his 
discretion." Hicks v. Southern Maryland Health Systems 
Agency, 805 F.2d 1165, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1986); Cruz, 762 
F.2d at 1236-38; see also Smith v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1152, 
1156 (7th Cir. 1987) (motion for attorney fees is governed 
by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, which " `imposes no time limit apart 
from an implicit requirement of reasonableness' " (quoting 
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 
1248 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 752 
(1984) (citation omitted))). The Ivys waited approximately 
three months after the May 30, 1997 decision to request 
supplemental attorney fees. In addition, all of the 
supplemental fees and expenses applied for were incurred, 
and therefore known to the Ivys, prior to the district court's 
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May 30, 1997 decision. Accordingly, the Ivys could and 
should have supplemented their fee request prior to the 
court's decision in Eleven Vehicles IV. Based on such 
equitable considerations, had the district court refused to 
entertain the Ivys' supplemental request because of their 
three-month delay, it would have been within its discretion 
so to do. This is especially true given the Supreme Court's 
admonition in Hensley that a request for attorney fees 
should not result in a second major litigation. Hensley, 461 
U.S. at 437. 
 
Nevertheless, the district court in the exercise of its 
discretion chose to entertain this supplemental request. 
The Ivys' initial fee request clearly covered only fees and 
expenses incurred through September 26, 1996. All parties 
were aware at the time that request was filed that the 
Government's motion for reconsideration of the Ivys' right 
to a fee award, the Ivys' motion for reconsideration of the 
Government's right to a certificate of reasonable cause, and 
the Ivys' motion for a cost of living adjustment to the 
compensable attorney billing rate remained pending before 
the district court. The Government acknowledges that in 
the course of litigating its objections to the Ivys'first 
request for fees and expenses, the Ivys put the court and 
the Government on notice that they reserved the right to 
submit a statement of fees and expenses incurred after 
September 26, 1996. The Ivys appear to have delayed three 
months in requesting additional fees and expenses because 
they incorrectly believed that they were required to wait to 
apply until 30 days after the May 30, 1997 judgment 
became unappealable. Thus, we cannot say that the district 
court abused its discretion in considering the Ivys' 
supplemental request.8 
 
Thus, we turn to the Ivys' challenges to the district 
court's legal analysis, and their argument that the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Government's suggestion that it was prejudiced by the Ivys' delay 
in filing its supplemental request because it could not appeal the final 
fee award rings hollow. The Government was free to appeal the May 30, 
1997 award if it chose so to do. The Government was also free to appeal 
the January 20, 1999 supplemental award if it chose to do so. It does 
not appear that the Government was in any way prejudiced by the Ivys' 
delay. 
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abused its discretion in failing to address their contention 
that the Government's memorandum in opposition to their 
supplemental fee request was untimely and should not 




The Ivys assert that the district court erred in several 
ways in its analysis of their supplemental fee request. Their 
arguments essentially boil down to the following: (1) the 
court failed to justify or explain its findings that the claim 
submitted was "excessive, redundant, or otherwise 
unnecessary"; (2) the court sua sponte improperly granted 
attorney fees in an amount below that requested in the 
absence of a Government challenge to the requested 
amount; (3) the court disallowed hours worked and granted 
less than the amount submitted without making the 
findings required by EAJA S 2412(d)(1)(C); and (4) the court 
failed to inquire into the particulars of the supplemental fee 
request, instead relying on its "generalized sense" of what 
fee was reasonable for the entire case. Our review of such 
challenges to the legal standards applied by the district 
court is plenary. See Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 
884 F.2d 713, 718 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The district court awarded the Ivys less in attorney 
fees than requested for the supplemental proceedings at 
least in part because it found that "the 190 hours spent by 
counsel appears `excessive, redundant and otherwise 
unnecessary.' " Eleven Vehicles V, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 239 
(quoting Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 621, 
633 (E.D. Pa. 1998)). When this court reviews such a 
finding, it is presented with two issues: "first, whether the 
district court abused its discretion in concluding that the 
hours expended on a certain task were excessive; and 
second, whether the district court abused its discretion in 
concluding that a certain number of hours would be a 
reasonable number of hours to expend on that task." Rode 
v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1187 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
The court, in the instant case, may have been correct in 
its conclusions but regrettably did not explain how it 
reached them. The Supreme Court has instructed that it is 
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important "for the district court to provide a concise but 
clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award." Hensley, 
461 U.S. at 437. We have held, in reviewing similar 
situations, that to resolve these issues "the district court 
must explain on the record the reasons for its decisions." 
Rode, 892 F.2d at 1187. Indeed, the lack of explanation 
makes it difficult for us to address with any competence the 
Ivys' remaining challenges to the district court's decision. 
We therefore are constrained to remand this case to the 
district court for an explanation of its reasons for the fee 
award. At the same time, we believe it is appropriate to 
provide the district court with some guidance bearing on 




First, the Court stated in Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Jean that "fees for fee litigation 
should be excluded to the extent that the applicant 
ultimately fails to prevail in such litigation." 496 U.S. at 
163 n.10. In the instant case, the Ivys request fees for one 
unsuccessful claim -- their motion and ensuing activity for 
the district court to reconsider its grant of a certificate of 
reasonable cause to the Government. In essence, this 
motion litigated the issue of the Ivys' entitlement to costs 
for the underlying forfeiture claim. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason why the Court's admonition about unsuccessful 
"fees for fee litigation" does not apply equally to "fees for 
cost litigation." See Hathaway v. United States, No. 93- 
36158, 1995 WL 66783, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1995); 
Davis v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. Colo. 





Second, the Ivys note that in this circuit, a court may not 
reduce counsel fees sua sponte as "excessive, redundant, or 
otherwise unnecessary" in the absence of a sufficiently 
specific objection to the amount of fees requested. In 
statutory fee cases, it is well settled in this circuit that in 
calculating the "lodestar," or initial fee calculation requiring 
 
                                13 
  
the court to multiply a reasonable hourly fee by the 
reasonable amount of hours worked, the district court may 
not award less in fees than requested unless the opposing 
party makes specific objections to the fee request. As this 
court stated in Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 
 
       when an opposing party has been afforded the 
       opportunity to raise a material fact issue as to the 
       accuracy of representations as to hours spent, or the 
       necessity for their expenditure, and declines to do so, 
       no reason occurs to us for permitting the trial court to 
       disregard uncontested affidavits filed by a fee 
       applicant. 
 
753 F.2d 262, 266 (3d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 
478 U.S. 1015 (1986), and reinstated, 807 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 
1986); see also McDonald v. McCarthy, 966 F.2d 112, 118 
(3d Cir. 1992); Bell, 884 F.2d at 719. A district court may 
not " `decrease a fee award based on factors not raised at all 
by an adverse party.' " Rode, 892 F.2d at 1183 (quoting 
Bell, 884 F.2d at 720).9 However, once the opposing party 
has made a sufficiently specific objection to the substance 
of a fee request, "the court has a great deal of discretion to 
adjust the fee award in light of these objections." Bell, 884 
F.2d at 721. The rationale for this prohibition on sua 
sponte fee award reductions is twofold. First, sua sponte 
reduction deprives the applicant of the right "to offer 
evidence in support of the reasonableness of the request." 
Bell, 884 F.2d at 719. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, "because statutory fee litigation is adversarial 
litigation, there is no need to allow the district court to 
reduce a fee award on its own initiative." Id. 
 
Although cases establishing and applying this rule 
appear to do so in calculating the "lodestar," we believe that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. One exception to this rule is that the district court may make sua 
sponte reductions where it has personal knowledge of the costs involved 
in certain aspects of the litigation, for example where the court presided 
over a hearing or conference and knows exactly how much time and 
effort that proceeding involved. See Cunningham, 753 F.2d at 267. For 
example, this exception would appear applicable in the present case to 
fees for the November 9, 1998 telephone conference over which the 
district court presided. 
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the rule's rationale applies with equal force to post- 
judgment supplemental applications for "fees for fee 
litigation" as it does in calculating fees due for litigating the 
merits of the underlying claim. Only with proper notice can 
the claimant know which request to defend as reasonable. 
Moreover, as evidenced by this case, post-judgment fee 
litigation remains adversarial. This circuit's precedent 
therefore binds the district court not to reduce the fee 
amount requested sua sponte, in the absence of a 
Government objection. Nevertheless, this prohibition on sua 
sponte reduction of fees applies only to challenges to the 
excessiveness of a fee request. Here, the Government's 
objections to the Ivys' supplemental fee request are more 
appropriately described as legal challenges to certain types 
of attorney work that are simply never compensable under 
the EAJA.10 Thus, if the district court agrees that categories 
of work for which the Ivys request fees are not compensable 
under the EAJA, it should prune the fees requested for this 
work from its fee award. Although the court could have 
taken this approach, it does not appear to have made any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The Government's statement challenging categories of work for which 
the Ivys requested fees, found in its memorandum in opposition to the 
Ivys' supplemental request for attorney fees and expenses, was as 
follows: 
 
        The Ivys seek to be compensated for limited negotiations in which 
       they rejected the Government's offer and then rejected the 
       Government's offer to negotiate a settlement and for research and 
       other post-judgment work. The Ivys even seek to be paid for giving 
       the Government claimants' and counsel's social security numbers, 
       required by the Treasury Department to write a check and even the 
       time it took to answer Treasury Department's confirming phone call 
       to counsel. (Exhibit 1, 7/22/97; 7/24/97, 7/30/97). 
 
        Post judgment time spent bringing unsuccessful appeals is not 
       compensable; it makes even less sense to award fees for the 
decision 
       not to take such an appeal. [Griffin v. Strong, 827 F. Supp. 683, 
687 
       (D. Utah 1993)]. Further, time devoted to clerical activities and 
       background research is normally included in overhead and not 
       billable to clients. The Government should not be held to pay such 
       expenses. Id. 
 
The Government placed the above-quoted passage under the heading: 
"No Award for Post-Judgment Work Absent Appeal." 
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of the legal conclusions invited by the Government's 
challenges. On the contrary, it stated that the fees 
requested were "excessive, redundant and otherwise 
unnecessary." Therefore, on remand, the court must clarify 
its reasons for the supplemental reward it made in 




Third, the Ivys argue that the court erred in disallowing 
the hours worked and granting less than the requested fee 
without making the findings required by 28 U.S.C. 
S 2412(d)(1)(C), a provision of the EAJA. It provides: 
 
       The court, in its discretion, may reduce the amount to 
       be awarded pursuant to this subsection, or deny an 
       award, to the extent that the prevailing party during 
       the course of the proceedings engaged in conduct 
       which unduly and unreasonably protracted the final 
       resolution of the matter in controversy. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(C). The Ivys claim that the rule 
required the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to make 
a finding of "dilatory conduct." Arguably, however, the court 
made just such a finding when it stated "the supplemental 
request involves work performed on motions for 
reconsideration of doubtful validity filed by both parties." 
Eleven Vehicles V, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 239. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not clear from the district court's 
opinion that it invoked its discretion under this provision. 
The opinion makes no reference to S 2412(d)(1)(C), and the 
court did not attempt any further explanation of its 
conclusion that the motions for reconsideration were"of 
doubtful validity." The district court, therefore, should 




Finally, the Ivys claim that the court erred in failing to 
look at the particulars of the supplemental request, in 
isolation from the prior fee award. The court noted that in 
analyzing the Ivys' supplemental fee request, "rather than 
inquiring into the particulars of the second itemized 
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statement, as a separate and distinct event, unlinked to the 
factors that informed the Court's rulings in thefirst 
itemized statement, the Court will consider what overall 
award of fees and expenses for all work counsel has 
performed in this case, will yield a reasonable fee." Eleven 
Vehicles V, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 239. The court considered 
this approach to be consistent with the Supreme Court's 
direction that the EAJA "favors treating the case as an 
inclusive whole rather than as atomized line-items." Id. 
(quoting Jean, 496 U.S. at 161-62). The district court 
followed the Supreme Court's direction. 
 
What the district court appears to have had in mind was 
the need to impose some degree of proportionality between 
the fees for the underlying merits litigation and fees for fee 
litigation. At least one other court of appeals has found this 
to be an important consideration. See Coulter v. Tennessee, 
805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that district 
court did not err in limiting number of compensable 
attorney hours spent litigating fees to 3-5% of hours spent 
litigating merits), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 914 (1987). At least 
one district court in this circuit concurs. See Jackson v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 858 F. Supp. 464, 477 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994). A trial court should be free to view a case in this 
pragmatic manner, subject to the guidelines we have 
articulated here. We see no error in the district court's 




The Ivys also assert that the court abused its discretion 
when it neglected to consider their argument that the 
Government's memorandum in opposition to their 
supplemental request for fees and expenses was untimely 
and should not have received any consideration. The Ivys 
served their supplemental request on the Government by 
sending it via overnight courier on Tuesday, August 26, 
1997 for delivery on Wednesday, August 27, 1997. Local 
Rule 7.1 required that the Government's opposition to this 
motion be served on the Ivys within 14 days after service of 
the Ivys' supplemental request. E.D. Pa. R. 7.1(c). This local 
rule also provides that "[i]n the absence of a timely 
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response, the motion may be granted as uncontested . . . ." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
Under Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the 14-day deadline for serving an opposition to the motion 
expired either on Wednesday, September 10, 1997, as the 
Ivys contend, or on Friday, September 12, 1997 if overnight 
courier delivery is considered service by mail under the 
Federal Rules, as the Government contends. As the Ivys 
observe, however, it does not matter which of these two 
dates was the true deadline. The memorandum in 
opposition was served on Monday, September 15, 1997, as 
the Government now concedes. Regardless of whether 
overnight courier service qualifies as service by mail, the 
Government's opposition was not timely filed. 11 
Nevertheless, the district court appears to have considered 
the arguments made therein. 
 
Local court rules play a significant role in the district 
courts' efforts to manage themselves and their dockets. 
Smith v. Oelenschlager, 845 F.2d 1182, 1184 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Accordingly, we have held that it is not an abuse of 
discretion for a district court to impose a harsh result, such 
as dismissing a motion or an appeal, when a litigant fails 
to strictly comply with the terms of a local rule. Id. at 1184- 
85. However, this court has not written on a district court's 
discretion to depart from its own local rule, whether that 
rule is phrased in discretionary or mandatory terms. 
 
In Smith v. Oelenschlager, for example, the district court 
dismissed the plaintiff 's motion for a new trial because the 
plaintiff failed to strictly comply with a local rule requiring 
him to order a trial transcript from the court reporter. Id. 
at 1182-83. Instead, the plaintiff had sent a letter to the 
district judge and the magistrate to whom the case had 
been assigned requesting that one of them forward his 
request to the court reporter. Id. We affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the motion, and found it unnecessary 
to reach the issue of whether a district court had discretion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We need not decide whether service by overnight courier satisfies the 
requirements for obtaining three additional "mail" days under Rule 6(e). 
See Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(describing debate among federal courts and collecting cases). 
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to entertain a new trial motion even though the plaintiff 
had failed to comply with the terms of the local rule. See id. 
at 1184. However, Judge Mansmann, in dissent, 
strenuously argued that district courts have inherent 
discretion to depart from their own local rules where justice 
so requires, and they have the responsibility to exercise 
that discretion. See id. at 1185-86 (Mansmann, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Although the language of Local Rule 7.1(c) is phrased in 
mandatory terms requiring a party opposing a motion to file 
a response and opposing brief within fourteen days after 
service of the motion, the subsequent language of the rule 
does not mandate the grant of the motion in the absence of 
a timely motion and brief. The court, under the rule, "may," 
but is not mandated, to grant the motion as uncontested. 
Other courts of appeal that have addressed the authority of 
a district court to depart from its local rule have uniformly 
determined that district courts possess inherent discretion 
to depart. See Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enter., Inc., 932 F.2d 
1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 
874 F.2d 43, 45-46 (1st Cir.) (noting and applying "widely- 
accepted idea that a district court should be accorded 
considerable latitude in applying local procedural rules of 
its own making, and in departing from them."), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 862 (1989); Braxton v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 728 
F.2d 1105, 1107 (8th Cr. 1984) ("It is for the district court 
to determine what departures from its rules may be  
overlooked.").12 Some of these courts have permitted district 
courts to depart from local rules even when the local rule 
is phrased in mandatory language. In Somlyo, Chief Judge 
Oakes of the Second Circuit, in the face of a mandatory 
local rule, held: "The district court's inherent discretion to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Other cases supporting the power of a court to depart from its own 
rule are: Allen v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 342 F.2d 951, 954 
(9th Cir. 1965) ("It is for the court in which a case is pending to 
determine, except as it is bound by precedents set by higher authority in 
its own judicial hierarchy, what departures from statutory prescription 
or rules of court are so slight and unimportant that the sensible 
treatment is to overlook them."); Slanina v. William Penn Parking Corp., 
Inc., 106 F.R.D. 419, 422 (W.D. Pa. 1984) ("noncompliance with the local 
rules may be excused by the court in its discretion"). 
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depart from the letter of the Local Rules extends to every 
Local Rule regardless of whether a particular Local Rule 
specifically grants the judge the power to deviate from the 
Rule." 932 F.2d at 1048. See also Braxton, 728 F.2d at 
1107. 
 
Several of these courts have made clear, however, that 
this discretion is not unfettered. For example, the Second 
Circuit in Somlyo stated that the district court "should ask 
whether the application of the letter of Local Rules to a 
particular case would cause an unjust result." 932 F.2d at 
1049. The First Circuit in Diaz-Villafane stated that to 
depart from its rules, a court "(1) must have a sound 
reason for doing so, and (2) must ensure that no party's 
substantial rights are unfairly jeopardized." 874 F.2d at 46. 
 
We believe these courts are generally correct in their 
approach permitting a district court to waive a requirement 
of its local rules in appropriate circumstances. We therefore 
hold that a district court can depart from the strictures of 
its own local procedural rules where (1) it has a sound 
rationale for doing so, and (2) so doing does not unfairly 
prejudice a party who has relied on the local rule to his 
detriment. 
 
In the instant case, the court failed to address the Ivys' 
argument that the Government's response was untimely 
filed. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the court 
abused its discretion. Therefore, on remand the district 
court should explain its apparent decision to waive the 14- 




Accordingly, the order of the district court will be 
vacated, and the case remanded for findings and 
explanatory statements consistent with this opinion. Each 
side to bear its own costs on this appeal. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur in the Court's judgment, but I write separately 
to explain my understanding of certain threshold 





I cannot agree with the majority's implicit conclusion that 
the issue of whether a Rule 59(e) motion is timelyfiled 
must be noticed sua sponte by this Court. The District 
Court rejected the government's Rule 59 argument and the 
government did not appeal this issue. Therefore, unless the 
question of timely filing implicated the District Court's 
subject matter jurisdiction, it is not properly before this 
Court. I believe that Rule 59 is merely a procedural bar, 
akin to a statute of limitations, that curtails a District 
Court's authority to permit an untimely motion to amend 
but does not deprive it of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, I think that we need not reach the merits of 
this question. 
 
Rule 59(e) provides that "[a]ny motion to alter or amend 
a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry 
of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 6 further 
provides that a district court "may not extend the time for 
taking any action" under Rule 59(e). Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). In 
this sense, the time limit imposed by the rule is"mandatory 
and jurisdictional." De la Fuente v. Central Elec. Coop., Inc., 
703 F.2d 63, 64 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting White v. New 
Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697, 699- 
700 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
 
Simply because the District Court has no power to extend 
the Rule 59 filing period, however, does not mean that the 
rule implicates subject matter jurisdiction. 1 By its terms, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although this Court has occasionally referred to Rule 59 as 
"jurisdictional," none of these cases discussed whether the rule 
implicates subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Schake v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp. Severance Plan for Salaried Employees, 960 F.2d 1187, 
1192 (3d Cir. 1992); Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360, 
1362 (3d Cir. 1990). I believe that these opinions used the language of 
"jurisdiction" only to emphasize the mandatory nature of the 10-day time 
limit, not to imply some connection with Article III subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
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Rule 59 does not govern subject matter, but rather sets a 
mandatory procedural limitation on the District Court's 
discretion to entertain a motion to amend. Cf. Curacao 
Drydock v. M/V Akritas, 710 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a), governing timely notice of 
appeals, as procedural but not implicating subject matter 
jurisdiction). Viewing Rule 59 as a merely procedural bar 
accords with Rule 82's mandate that "[t]hese rules shall not 
be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
United States District Courts." Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. See also 
14 Moore's Federal Practice S 82.02 (1999) ("For the purpose 
of [Rule 82], jurisdiction means subject matter jurisdiction") 
(emphasis in original); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. 
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("It is axiomatic that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw 
federal jurisdiction."). Judge Flaum, writing for six judges 
in an evenly-split Seventh Circuit decision, elucidated this 
point: 
 
       Subject matter jurisdiction is not . . . necessarily the 
       appropriate approach to the 10-day timeline of [Rule 
       59]. Subject matter jurisdiction is controlled by a 
       statute explicitly labeled as such. Neither Rule 59 not 
       Rule 6 are styled jurisdictional. Moreover, subject 
       matter jurisdiction is informed by concerns for 
       federalism. No such concern is present here. . . . Had 
       Congress intended the 10-day time period to be 
       interpreted like subject matter jurisdiction, it would 
       have said so; yet it was silent. 
 
Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 
1569 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Flaum, J., concurring). 
 
Finally, I would note that both the Supreme Court and 
this Court have recognized an equitable exception to Rule 
59. This "unique circumstances" exception, first announced 
in Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per curiam), 
permits a litigant who relies on an extension improperly 
issued by the District Court to perfect his appellate rights 
by filing a Rule 59 motion within the period extended by 
the court's order. See Kraus, 899 F.2d at 1362. Although 
this narrow exception does not apply to the present case, 
the mere fact that there is an equitable exception shows 
that Rule 59's strictures do not implicate Article III subject 
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matter jurisdiction: "[e]quitable tolling or estoppel simply is 
not available when there are jurisdictional limitations." 
Shendock v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1466 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc). 
 
If, as I conclude, Rule 59 does not implicate subject 
matter jurisdiction, then this Court is not required to notice 
the issue of untimely filing on its own initiative. While I 
have no substantive disagreement with the Court's 
conclusion that Rule 59(e) does not apply to supplemental 
fee requests, I believe that we need not reach this issue 




I agree with the Court that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) to 
consider the Ivys' supplemental request for attorney fees 
and expenses. I would, however, employ a somewhat 
different analysis in reaching this conclusion. 
 
The EAJA requires that a party seeking a fee award 
submit its application to the court "within thirty days of 
final judgment in the action." 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(1)(B). The 
majority holds that "the underlying `action' here is the 
Government's forfeiture proceeding . . . . The `final 
judgment' contemplated by the statute . . . is the[March 
26, 1996] judgment dismissing that forfeiture proceeding." 
Maj. Op. at 9. The majority then dismisses the District 
Court's August 30, 1996 ruling awarding, inter alia, a 
certificate of reasonable cause to the government as 
"ancillary" and "involv[ing] only post-judgment residual 
proceedings." Maj. Op. at 9. 
 
I disagree. In my view, the order granting a certificate of 
reasonable cause was an " `integral part' of the final 
judgment on the merits even though not entered 
concurrently with that judgment." United States v. One 
1986 Ford Pickup, 56 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
finality requirement should be given "a practical rather 
than a technical construction." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 375 (1981) (citation omitted). 
Under this functional standard, "a `final decision' generally 
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is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." 
Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). As the 
Ford Pickup court noted, the decision whether to grant a 
certificate of reasonable cause is functionally part of the 
merits judgment: a certificate may be granted only by the 
judge presiding over the forfeiture action; it is binding on 
the parties and bars any future action for damages; and it 
must be issued soon after the entry of judgment, before 
costs are taxed. See 56 F.3d at 1185. Most importantly, the 
decision of whether or not to grant the certificate involves 
questions of fact and law that are intimately tied to the 
merits of the underlying forfeiture action.2 On this basis, I 
believe that the relevant "judgment" in this case -- the one 
"which end[ed] the litigation on the merits," Catlin, 324 U.S. 
at 233 -- was the August 30, 1996 order granting the 
certificate of reasonable cause. 
 
Under the EAJA, a "final judgment" is "a judgment that 
is final and not appealable." 28 U.S.C. S 2412(d)(2)(G). The 
30-day period for filing an EAJA attorneys fee claim does 
not begin to run "until the time for filing a notice of appeal 
[has] expired." Baker v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 234, 235 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Because the parties filed Rule 59(e) 
motions for reconsideration of the District Court's August 
30 judgment, the time for appeal did not begin to run until 
"the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion 
outstanding." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(C). 
 
Thus, the appellate door in this case did not close until 
60 days after the May 30, 1997, adverse ruling on the 
motions for reconsideration. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) 
(setting 60-day limit for appeal in cases where United 
States is a party). The Ivys' motion for supplemental fees 
was filed within 30 days of the end of the appeals period, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The litigation over the certificate of reasonable cause cannot be 
dismissed as mere "cost litigation." Although the grant of the certificate 
did preclude Ivy from recovering costs for the forfeiture claim, it also 
addressed substantive issues of liability that would be highly relevant if 
Ivy chose to file a S 1983 claim against the seizing officers or 
prosecutors 
in the case. See 28 U.S.C. S 2465 (if certificate is issued, neither the 
person who made the seizure nor the prosecutor shall"be liable to suit 
or judgment on account of such suit or prosecution"). 
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placing it well within the EAJA's statutory window of 
opportunity. Because I believe that the supplemental 
motion was filed within the statute's 30-day time limit, I see 
no need to consider whether the District Court could, in its 




Finally, I am in general agreement with part III of the 
opinion of the Court.3 I write separately, however, to 
express my view that the "proportionality review" alluded to 
in part IIID is necessarily limited in scope. Once an adverse 
party has made a sufficiently specific challenge to a 
particular expense area, a District Court should certainly 
look back to previous awards in the same area in 
determining the reasonableness of the requested 
supplemental fee. In this sense, every supplemental fee 
request entails a "global" review of the entire fee award. 
 
I do not, however, read the opinion of the Court to 
authorize a District Court to conduct a plenary review of an 
entire EAJA fee award for "proportionality" based on a 
general allegation of unreasonableness by the objecting 
party. Such a reading would vitiate the well-established 
principle that a District Court cannot sua sponte order a 
reduction of what it perceives to be an excessive fee. See, 
e.g., McDonald v. McCarthy, 966 F.2d 112, 118-19 (3d Cir. 
1992); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 
1990); Bell v. United Princeton Properties, Inc., 884 F.2d 
713, 720 (3d Cir. 1989). Permitting such free-ranging 
discretion would unwisely abandon "the carefully crafted 
set of rules for the exercise of district court discretion in fee 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. For the reasons stated above, I do not agree with the majority's 
conclusion in part III(A) that the motion to reconsider the grant of a 
certificate of reasonable cause merely "litigated the issue of the Ivy's 
entitlement to costs for the underlying forfeiture claim." Maj. Op. at 13. 
I agree, however, with the majority's general point that the District 
Court 
may decline to award fees for unsuccessful litigation on particular 
issues, see, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), especially 
when, as the District Court found here, the party was merely "rehashing" 
previous arguments "of doubtful validity." United States v. Eleven 
Vehicles, 36 F. Supp. 2d 237, 239 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
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shifting cases" for "some standardless rule of district court 
gestalt." Cunningham v. City of McKeesport, 753 F.2d 262, 
267 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
On remand, the District Court should be free to consider 
(and explain in its opinion) whether properly-challenged fee 
categories were "excessive" in light of both the initial and 
the supplemental fee requests. However, the government's 
bare allegation "in general terms that the time spent was 
excessive" is not, in my view, enough to empower the 
District Court to conduct a generalized proportionality 
review of the entire fee award. See Bell, 884 F.2d at 720. 
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